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INTRODUCTION
As everyone knows, the mapping of the basic components of
the genetic code was completed in June of 2000. 1 Its beneficial
effect gave us the ability to analyze the smallest biologic samples
derived from an individual (a drop of blood invisible to the naked
eye, a strand of hair, or a scale of dandruff), and it allowed us to
verify the presence of specific genes, hence to reveal a multitude
of information regarding the individual that the sample originated
from. In particular, the DNA structure contains an infinite amount
of information regarding the specific traits of an individual, such
as, ex multis, the body's morphology, skin pigmentation, ethnic and
racial traits.
Furthermore, studies have shown that DNA
determines, at least to some extent, intelligence and personality
and it provides additional means of detection for the identification
of hereditary illnesses, such as Down syndrome, hemophilia, and
cystic fibrosis. Its negative effect was to establish a different,
ulterior method, by which the personal rights of that same
individual can be illicitly violated.
The analysis of the legal implications of such a phenomenon is
a very complex one because of the needs to balance two opposite
interests. On one side is scientific research, which fears that
imposing overly strict limitations on the developments of new
techniques of manipulation of genetic information would
excessively restrict the research itself and would impede the
achievement of new results beneficial to human society. On the
other side are the privacy concerns; the need to take into account
the interests of individuals to be granted efficient protection of
their genetic identity. In addition, the complexity of such an
analysis is increased by the speed of the above mentioned
developments in respect of the lack of ad hoc legal provisions in
1. See for example Michael J. Malinowski, Separating Predictive Genetic
Testing from Snake Oil: Regulation, Liabilities, and Lost opportunities, 1
JURIMETRICS J. 23 (2000) (arguing that the completion of the maps of human
genome has raised concerns related to the inadequacy of existing law provisions
to properly deal with the new challenges of biotechnology); and Michael J.
Malinowski, Ethics in Global Biopharmaceutical Environment, 1 SANTA CLARA
J. INT. L. 57 (2006) (identifying different options to establish a workable
baseline of protection of human subjects in order to develop in a responsible
manner the biopharmaceutical research, and, therefore, being benefited by the
manifold opportunities related to such developments).
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order to deal with such new issues, and the consequent need to try
to address these challenges by means of the traditional legal
doctrines.
It is interesting to consider the North American judicial system
in this respect, in view of the fact, as some may say, that it has
developed the most advanced genetic research and techniques, and
also because, as Antonio Gambaro says, it was the “cradle” of
privacy rights. 2 Because of this, this system has been acclaimed as
being the best foreign model from which to derive legal provisions
aimed to discourage these new types of attacks on personal rights,
and mandate compensation for their victims. Within this context,
we find not only the analysis of the collection of different possible
violations (intrusions), but also a list of entities capable of
executing them, an array of legislative, doctrinal and
jurisprudential sources that are used to protect the genetic identity
of the individual, and an initial panel of solutions to the problems
encountered so far. The reference to privacy rights in particular
deserves to be highlighted because of the strong arguments
supporting the idea that a violation of an individual’s genetic
information could be deemed a violation of their right to privacy.
On the contrary, the specific topic of genetic identity within the
Italian legal framework, with some exceptions, 3 appears to be
taking off. 4 This may be due to several factors, among which we
2. Antonio Gambaro, Falsa luce agli occhi del pubblico, 1 RIV. DIR. CIV. 84
( 1981).
3. See in particular, Stefano Rodotà, Tra diritto e società. Informazioni
genetiche e tecniche di tutela, RIV. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 571 (2000); AMEDEO
SANTOSUOSSO, CORPO E LIBERTA, UNA STORIA TRA DIRITTO E SCIENZA (Milano,
2001) (both focusing on the legal implications of the human body as a source of
genetic information and dealing with the issues that will be addressed later in the
present paper, for example that of biologic group and the collection of DNA
samples).
4. Within the Italian scenario, as well as many other countries, the topic of
genetic information has been deemed as a species of the broader notion of
“sensitive data” pertaining to an individual and falling within the notion of
“privacy right.” In particular, Stefano Rodotà, the former President of the
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (the Italian Authority for the
protection of privacy rights, hereinafter “Garante”), highlighted that genetic
information has a “structural and lasting attitude,” because “the genetic asset is
defined and unalterable during the whole biological life of an individual; it
shows his/her uniqueness and puts the individual in relation with others; it is the
direct biological link between the individual and the other generations; and, as a
consequence, it is an immortal element, while, on the contrary, all the other
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can briefly recall two concurring elements. On one side is the
issue of genetic identity as a new concept of personal identity
which shows to have a peculiar nature because the whole identity
pertaining to an individual can be found even in the smallest–and,
at least at first sight, insignificant–sample of human biological
material separated from the body to which it pertains, 5 seems to
have been neglected within the Italian scenario in favor of other
issues related to the implication of the DNA manipulation and the

biological traits will die with the individual.” Stefano Rodotà, Le informazioni
genetiche, TECNOLOGIE E DIRITTI 208 (1995). The same, in addition, pointed
out that, since the genetic information is almost always manipulated in order to
transform it in “genetic data,” such data must be equated to the category of
“personal data,” subjected to the protection allowed by Italian privacy
provisions. However, those provisions lack a specific definition of “genetic
data” (as highlighted by the Garante in its decision as of May 22nd, 1999) and,
consequently, it becomes very difficult to grant an appropriate protection to such
a peculiar category of information. In order to fill this gap, it has been
suggested to apply the definition of genetic data adopted by the Eur. Council
Recommendation, Doc. No. R (97) 5, which includes in such a concept all data–
regardless of their nature–concerning the hereditary characters of an individual
or the ways to transfer them within a group of individuals linked by blood ties.
Within the legal category of personal data, genetic data belong to the sub-class
of “sensitive data,” which–according to the Italian privacy provisions–can be
used only with the written consent of the owner and the previous authorization
of the Garante. But, it must be stressed that, in spite of such a general rule,
several exceptions to the collection and utilization of those data are allowed: for
further details see the so called Privacy Code (Codice della privacy) enacted
with the D.lgs. as of June 30th 2003, no. 196, issued in the Ordinary section of
the Italian official bulletin of the law (Gazzetta Ufficiale) as of July 29th, 2003,
no. 174; and, in particular, art. 90 of it, named Trattamento dei dati gentici e dei
donatori di midollo osseo. This rule requires an authorization ad hoc of the
Garante for the purposes of the utilization of those data and, therefore, it could
help in better dealing with the issue at stake: but, it must be warned that such a
provision is a pretty recent one, since it has been adopted as of February 22nd,
2007. In the meantime, in order to fill such a gap, temporary provisions had
been enacted, which contributed to render the Italian legal scenario more
complex and more heterogeneous. Anyway, it deserves to be highlighted that
the Italian legal framework, as well as that of many other countries, is grounded
around the idea of “free and informed consent” of the individual as main
element to deal with the issue of genetic information and, therefore, it raises
concerns similar to those already addressed in other foreign legal models and
among them the US one represents a very interesting model of comparison, as
already explained.
5. For example: a broken nail, a hair, a droop of saliva left on a cup of
coffee, a droop of blood in the event of an accidental cut, etc.
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notion of genetic material: i.e., assisted procreation, utilization of
human embryonal staminal cells, the legal status of the embryo and
of the so called pre-embryo, the issue of genetic modified
organisms, and so on. 6
On the other side, the specific topic of genetic identity and the
related opportunity to identify an individual by means of his/her
genetic information, has thus far been presented to the eyes of the
Italian society mainly in its positive aspects, as an efficient and
fundamental tool in order to pursue very worthwhile aims,
especially for investigational purposes: in this respect, two
significant examples may be provided.
The Italian judge Giovanni Falcone–who was well known even
outside Italy because of his fight against the phenomenon of the
mafia, and who also had the opportunity to actively cooperate with
the American investigative authorities–was killed by an explosive
device while he was driving from the airport of Capaci to his
apartment in Palermo. Since this event occurred in 1992, and at
that time the new tools of DNA investigation were not so
developed in Italy, the Italian investigative authorities required the
cooperation of Americans in order to try to identify the perpetrator
of such a crime. The identification was possible by extracting the
DNA sample of the killer from the saliva left on the cigarette filters
he had smoked while waiting for Mr. Falcone’s car. In current
news, the whole European society is riveted by the story of Maddy,
an English child who disappeared in Portugal during a holiday with
her family. At one point, it appeared she was in Belgium because
a lady had seen in a coffee shop a child who resembled her. In
6. See, among others, Massimo C. Bianca, Nuove tecniche genetiche, regole
giuridiche e tutela dell’essere umano, 3-4 IL DIRITTO DELLA FAMIGLIA E DELLE
PERSONE, 955-970 (1987) (focusing on the legal implications of artificial
insemination); Stefano Rodotà, Trasformazioni del corpo, in Politica del diritto,
2006, issue no. 1, at 3-24 (dealing with the manifold notions of the term body
when related to the human being). In addition, such an issue has been perceived
as falling within the more complex area of the relationships between law and
ethics and, in particular, within the bioethics field, about which the debate is
very developed and many contributions have been published: see, for example,
FRANCESCO DONATO BUSNELLI, BIOETICA E DIRITTO PRIVATO. FRAMMENTI DI
UN DIZIONARIO 3-4 (2001); Paolo Zatti, Verso un diritto per la bioetica, in UNA
NORMA GIURIDICA PER LA BIOETICA 3 (Cosimo M. Mazzoni ed., 1998). See also
the reports of the Italian “Comitato nazionale per la bioetica,” available at
http://www.governo.it/bioetica.html (last visited November 6, 2008).
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order to verify whether that child truly was Maddy or not, the
competent authorities were able to obtain a sample of her DNA by
the glass she had used to drink, and then they could compare it
with the sample of DNA provided by the family of Maddy.
Thanks to such a technique, they were able to determine that
(unfortunately) the child was not Maddy.
In Italy, the debate about the opportunity of establishing DNA
databanks for the collection of DNA profiles and/or DNA samples
for investigational purposes–as well as it has been done within the
US and in other European Countries–has just arisen. 7
Consequently, the analysis so far carried out has not yet reached a
deep perspective, unlike those which have occurred within the US,
at least with reference to the concerns about the possible new
forms of intrusion and violation of the individual’s genetic identity
together with the manifold legal implications of such a
phenomenon.
Within the European Union, such a topic so far has been
addressed only from a specific perspective: the protection of socalled “biological inventions.” In fact, the Directive 98/44/CE, 8
which has been implemented in Italy by Law 78/2006, addresses
the new phenomenon of biological inventions and manipulation of
organic material (even human). It allows such inventions,
provided that they meet all the requirements to be deemed an
“invention” according to the Directive’s provisions, to be subjected
to the rules of patent law. The first concern of the Directive,
therefore, appears to be economic. Nevertheless, the same
Directive shows a willingness to take into account the moral
concerns related to such a phenomenon, together with the
opportunity to preserve the dignity of the individual. Therefore, it
7. As of November 2007, such an issue is in the agenda of the Italian
Parliament: see, for example, the Attachment A to the hearing n. 221, held on
October 10th, 2007, at 34-35, including proposal of amendments to article 6 of
the draft of law n. 782 (arguing, in particular, for the introduction of ad hoc
DNA databanks, to be created with the consent of the Garante), available at
http://legxv.camera.it/docesta/312/14367/documentoesterno.asp?a=internet&ann
omese=2007%2C10&commit=invia (last visited November 6, 2008)
8. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
July 6th, 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. Official
Journal L 213, 30/07/1998 P. 0013–0021; available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last visited December 19, 2008).
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expressly recognizes some limits to the activity related to
biotechnology, in particular those of public order and good morals,
in addition to strictly forbidding the patentability of human cloning
and the utilization of human embryos for commercial purposes
(Art. 6 § 2 of the Directive). Finally, the Italian law implementing
the Directive requires the free and informed consent of the donor
of biological material as a fundamental element in order to submit
the request of patentability of the invention, thus complying with
art. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. 9
But, again, such provisions appear to address the present
phenomenon only from a specific point of view. The mere
reference to the notion of “public order and good morals” is not
able to cover all the juridical implications of it; furthermore, those
are evolving concepts, whose determination is subject to periodical
assessment. In addition, as we will show with our analysis, the
“consent argument” does not always seem to be the best solution in
order to address such an issue. Therefore, in spite of the
regulation, the specific issue of genetic identity cannot be deemed
to have yet been thoroughly examined or have taken into account
all the possible and manifold legal implications pertaining to it.
Furthermore, in order to try to reach a more complete awareness of
those implications, the analysis of genetic identity, in our opinion,
could benefit from comparison with the developments in a
different legal system, such as the American one.

9. Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01):
Article 3–“Right to the integrity of the person”
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and
mental integrity.
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be
respected in particular:
. The free and informed consent of the person concerned,
according to the procedures laid down by law,
. The prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at
the selection of persons,
. The prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such
a source of financial gain,
. The prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
The full text of the Charter is available in English at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (last visited November 6,
2008).
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Accordingly, the present work will try to address the legal
implications surrounding the issue of genetic identity by referring
to the complex and heterogeneous scenario of doctrines and legal
provisions which characterizes the American legal system in
attempting to better understand such a phenomenon. 10
PART I
THE LIMITS OF THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
A. Intrusions and the Intruders
Initially the ability to perform DNA analysis was beneficial to
the individual, as it was used to diagnose illnesses, and determine
the best course of medical treatment. However, thereafter, these
tests started to have a negative impact on the individual. They
provided an ideal tool to benefit and facilitate the potentially
discriminatory activities of entities such as employers and
insurance providers, for example, that could use the otherwise
unknown genetic information to determine who to hire and who to
insure. 11 As it has been highlighted:
The danger is that individuals will be judged according to
genetic stereotypes and divided into groups based upon
their genetic predispositions. Thus, invasions of genetic
privacy are not only selective, but also segmenting: they
balkanize a population based upon its genes, generating
genetic divisions that may produce new structures of
inequality. 12
The potential for misuse of the data is at times augmented by
the prevailing cultural environment that tends to regard genetic
data as a magical force and some sort of cultural icon.

10. Attilio Guarneri wrote Part I of the present paper, while Laura Franciosi
developed Part II.
11. See for example: Nathalie Smith The right to Genetic Privacy? Are We
Unlocking the Secrets of the Human Genome Only to Risk Insurance and
Employment Discrimination?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 705 (2000).
12. Radhika Rao, A Veil of genetic ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy
to Insure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006).
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Ken M. Gatter has addressed the current gene hegemony in his
speeches, 13 and the anthropologist Kaja Finkler described the
central role of DNA in the definition of our identity:
Everything about an oorganism's existence is
predetermined and genetically programmed, including its
variation, although geneticists recognize that the program
may be affected by unknown and external factors in the
environment, chance, or human manipulation.
The
sequence of our DNA reveals to us who and what we are;
that is, what it means to be human. With DNA sequencing,
some scientists have maintained that the riddle of life is
close to being solved. 14
Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee, in turn, described how
public opinion views the role of DNA:
Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal
concept through which to understand the person and
continuity of self, so DNA appears in popular culture as a
soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden
territory. The similarity between the powers of DNA and
those of the Christian soul, we suggest, is more than
linguistic or metaphorical. DNA has taken on the social
and cultural functions of the soul. It is the essential entity–
the location of the true self–in the narratives of biological
determinism. 15
The information's potential for misuse is made particularly
dangerous by the fact that the practice of analyzing data has
quickly spread over multiple levels. In fact, today there is much
apprehension surrounding potential misuse of genetic information.
The results of a survey conducted in North America in 1997
showed that two-thirds of the people interviewed would refuse to
undergo genetic testing if they knew that their employer, or the

13. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of Context:
Implications for the Social Meaning of Genetic Information and Individual
Identity, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 423 (2003).
14. KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND
KINSHIP ON THE MEDICAL FRONTIER 48 (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 2000).
15. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON 41-42 (1995).
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insurer that covers their medical expenses, could become aware of
the results of said analysis. 16
Scholars remind us that this is also quite relevant within the
scope of major decisions that concern the private life of
individuals. A person's decision regarding choices such as whether
or not to marry someone, or whether or not to have children with
someone, could be affected if that person became aware of the
other individual's genetic profile. 17 Other studies remind us that
DNA findings pertain not only to the individual that was tested, but
also concern all members of the family that person belongs to. 18
Illicit use of data is particularly insidious because–and here we
move beyond the analysis of intrusion to the analysis of intruders–
genetic information is no longer the exclusive monopoly of
researchers, as it will soon be made available to private parties as
well. In the near future, the general public will be able to purchase
reasonably priced market tests. Now consider the analysis that
could be conducted on exfoliated skin left on objects handled in an
office or in a waiting room. The vulnerability of a person's genetic
privacy has increased dramatically.
B. Protective Legislative Measures
The US Congress has intervened several times, and with
increasing frequency, to protect the genetic identity of the
individual, and prevent private entities from using genetic
information as basis for discriminatory practices. The Privacy Act
of 1974 addresses the need to protect privacy in general terms,
with no specific provisions for genetic privacy. It only protects
government employees from divulgation of confidential data
already on file, and it offers no protection to prevent private parties
from acquiring information, even if genetic by nature.19 It was
followed in 1990 by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
which aimed to prevent discriminatory practices against disabled
16. Gatter, supra note 13, at 427-428. See also Paul S. Miller, Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 189 (1998).
17. See, for example, George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be
a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9 (1999).
18. On this topic see infra Part II, paragraph 4.
19. See generally Anita Silvers & Michael A. Stein, Human Rights and
Genetic Discrimination: Protecting Genomics' Promise For Public Health, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 377 (2003).
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individuals in the workplace. It contains at least two prerequisites:
an act of discrimination and a documented disability. However,
because the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA in a manner
that excludes genetic predispositions, and also because it does not
pertain to acquiring data per se, it is largely inept for the purpose
of safeguarding genetic identity. 20
In 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) followed. It was issued to protect the privacy of
health records, and specifically addresses genetic information, but
the law only applies to specific types of information and not
others. 21 In summary, the overall scope of federal legislation does
not offer sufficient protection against illicit genetic data
acquisition. For this reason some states, such as Florida, have
adopted more rigorous and restrictive laws, which mandate that
DNA testing may only be conducted after obtaining consent from a
duly informed individual, and that violators are subject to
sanctions, incarceration, and fines. 22
Practitioners express, however, that there are some doubts
concerning the effective application of these more rigorous state
laws. 23 If we look beyond the actual legislation (Federal and
State), and consider the jurisprudential and doctrinal aspects, we
immediately notice that there are two distinct levels of protection
for genetic information: protection from government intrusion and
from intrusion by private entities. The first contains a collection of
cases pertaining to military personnel, inmates, etc.; the level of
protection here is “weak,” and at this point somewhat established,
although not free of problems, both old and new.
The analysis of the second level of protection, which we now
expand upon, starts with a reconstruction of the protection of
20. See, for example, Mark A Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and
Confidentiality: Why They Are So Hard to Protect?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198,
201 (1998).
21. Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, The Genetics Revolution:
Conflicts, Challenges and Conundra, 28 AM. J. L. AND MED. 285, 287-292
(2002).
22. See, for example, Ben F. Overton and Katherine E. Giddings, The Right
of Privacy in Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A
Need for Protection From Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 25 (1997).
23. June Mary Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New tort?, 34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 978 (2001).
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privacy in tort, which finds its roots in the history of North
American common law. The ancestry of the current remedy for
privacy intrusion lies in the physical trespass, which was, in turn,
the heir to the British medieval transgressio. It was elaborated
upon in a famous essay written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, that was published by the Harvard
Law Review in 1890, 24 and preceded, two years prior, by a treatise
named On the Law of Torts by Judge Cooley, the author who
defined privacy as being the right to be let alone. 25
Approximately 70 years later, William L. Prosser, in a famous
essay that appeared in 1960 in the California Law Review, tried to
systematize the variegated constellation of juridical examples of
personal rights violations. On the theme of privacy, he created
four related yet distinct subsections: Intrusion; Public Disclosure
of Private Facts; Appropriation of the Name or Likeness; and
False Light in the Public Eye. 26 That classification, after being
widely circulated in literature and Courts’ opinions, was
incorporated in the Second Restatement on the Law of Torts. 27
In order to analyze the juridical instruments most widely used
in genetic identity proceedings that pertain to violations made by
private parties, we must start with the sub-tort named Intrusion. Its
origins can be reconstructed, by means of Prosser's classification,
to the violation of privacy. The sub-tort of Intrusion, as a type of
disturbance, may have three different aspects: physical, spatial, and
psychological. The first and second indicate an actual physical
space, as expressed by the aphorism: A man’s home is his castle.
Let us also recall the famous quote from The Right to Privacy:
‘The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his
castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the
execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front
entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to
idle or prurient curiosity?’ 28 The third relates to non-physical
intrusions, and is tied to technological advances, such as telephone
taps, microphones, etc., that involve some sort of high-tech prying,
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890-1891).
25. THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
26. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 6A, v. “Privacy.”
28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 220.
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espionage-like virtual trespassing; investigative harassment,
continual phone calls and sexual harassment can also be viewed in
this context. The common factor in these type of cases is Judge
Cooley's “right to be let alone,” that when extended from its
original material and spatial concept of what is proprietary by
nature, to a scope that also includes the degree of control any
individual has over his/her information, impacts the overall dignity
“profile” of a person. The original proprietary concept of the
inviolability of a castle or a sanctuary can also be associated with
the last mentioned personal profile, and in this manner convey the
image of a person as being inviolable.
Psychological violations evoke the idea of peace of mind, an
area that is proprietary and personalistic at the same time; it
pertains to information about an individual, and is ruled by the
principle of jus excludendi alios. 29 The intrusion truly consists of
a violation of this private sphere, which is dominated by the
identity and personality of a single individual.
Protection against intrusions into the sphere of information
about oneself (information one wishes to keep private) preserves
the dignity of the individual in two ways. On the one hand, it
precludes unauthorized access to personal information; on the
other, it prevents falsification of this data. In both directions this
protection is applicable to Genetic privacy.
C. Balancing the Rights
Privacy protection, even genetic, must not however mean
absolute protection from all types of intrusions by others. As
proposed in the Restatement Second of the Law of Torts, the rights
must be properly balanced. According to that disposition, one,
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 30
29. From a comparative perspective, such an argument is very interesting
because it involves also the proprietary paradigm because, for example,
according to art. 832 of the Italian Civil Code, the so called ius excludendi alios
is one of the main powers embodied in the definition of property and therefore
granted to the owner of a good.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
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Hence, making annoyance calls and probing into someone's life
with no due cause are considered to be illicit activities. On the
contrary, the need to establish an adequate level of protection
against thefts can justify an employer's “intrusions” upon the
privacy of employees, and similar intrusions are permissible when
government authorities need to gather evidence for a case.
While talking specifically about genetic identity violations, we
must consider Prosser's principle, by which the right of being let
alone does not apply to an individual while in a public place
unless, as mentioned in the Restatement Second of the Law of
Torts, the matter involves a violation of private rights. To better
identify what constitutes this type of matter, it's useful to recall
cases that involved photographers taking pictures of people who,
while in public places, unwillingly found themselves in a
vulnerable situation. An example of this could be a woman whose
skirt had been thrown up by the wind, and is therefore
photographed with her private parts exposed. 31 Briefly, the act of
regulating the balance of rights poses restrictions upon Prosser's
principle when there are specific reasons to aptly justify the
applicability of privacy protection measures. The current trend is
to progressively expand the sub-tort of intrusion, as occurred
within the specific contexts later discussed, and apply this
definition to cases that pertain to the protection of genetic
identity. 32
The topics of sexual harassment in the workplace, employee
drug testing, and surveillance conducted by mechanical means
such as cameras, video recording equipment etc. require, as
always, the careful balancing of interests. Actions undertaken to
fight drugs and thefts justify intruding upon someone else's private
life, as long as any reasonable individual would deem that they did
not violate the personal integrity of an individual. Sometimes, the
valuation depends upon the actual intent (or lack thereof) of the
intrusion, and the values involved. For example, in a spousal
separation civil suit that included awarding custody of a minor, the
husband took a picture of his semi-nude wife from the window of
her lesbian lover's bedroom. This was not deemed to be a violation
of the wife's right to privacy in view of the intent to protect the
minor from being exposed to sexual activities that could occur in
31. See generally Makdisi, supra note 23.
32. Id.
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the family dwelling. Briefly, a reasonable opinion takes into
consideration the purpose, the psychological motives (intentional
or not), the means, the methods used, and the intensity of the
identity violation committed towards others.
D. The Applicability of the Sub-Tort of Intrusion within the Scope
of Genetic Identity
According to June Mary Makdisi, there are at least three
specific questions that need to be answered in order to verify
whether the sub-tort of intrusion could be applied to protect genetic
identity: a) can genetic information be qualified as strictly personal
information, and be protected under the assumptions of tort by
intrusion; b) whether this constitutes a tort when it pertains to
genetic information obtained from biological samples initially
collected in a “public place;” c) if the extraction of genetic DNA
information from biological tissues would be deemed as being
highly offensive by a reasonable person. 33
Genetic information resides within tangible materials, ones that
can be seen, touched, and collected, and performing any of these
actions does not necessarily mean committing a tort of intrusion.
Genetic material exposed to public view does not reveal any
information by itself. It can yield genetic information only after
being subjected to close-up examinations, such as being viewed
under a microscope for example, or via a genetic test. There is no
doubt, in answer to the first question, that genetic data is strictly
tied to someone's identity, and that acquiring all of the genetic
information is essential in discovering the identity of an individual.
There is no doubt, in answer to the second question, that the act of
collecting genetic information does not per se constitute a tort of
intrusion: if that were the case, professionals could be at fault each
time they perform a genetic test. In this scenario, the genetic
doctor's position is equivalent to that of the previously mentioned
photographer’s position. The doctor could be held liable of
committing an act of intrusion only if he takes advantage of the
involuntary vulnerability of the test subject and, without the
informed consent thereof, breaches the sphere of privacy of an
individual.

33. Id. at 1024.

154

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 1

The Restatement Second of the Law of Torts suggests that illicit
intrusions should be considered as being those that are deemed to
be offensive by the victim, and those the extent of which is
objectively disproportionate compared to the interests of the
aggressor. Generally, the diffusion of genetic information could
subjectively be considered as being both offensive and
unreasonable. Let's consider the case of a genetic test that reveals
a predisposition to pedophilia. Even a test that is the most accurate
from a scientific standpoint can not reliably predict the future
development, or on the contrary, the regression of the hereditary
genetic traits of a person. In the same manner, no one can be sure
that a person predisposed to develop great musculature will
actually become an athlete.
In view of this premise, it then becomes clear that individuals
should have the right to choose if they wish to reveal or not to
others genetic information that by its nature could compromise
their personal dignity. Some could argue that a genetic test
showing a predisposition to rise early in the morning or retire late
contains no information that warrants legal protection. What
would happen if those genetic traits were later found to be
connected to other chromosomes, and thereby yield a store of
genetic information that current science is unable to predict? How
could we deny responsibility for that intrusion when genetic
information, once disclosed, cannot be retracted?
These questions are only indicative of the overall complexity
of the topic, and, in answer to the third question, lead us to
conclude that the legalities of disclosing genetic information
should be established on a case by case basis. It is certain that we
should consider that: a) the extraction of genetic information from
someone else's tissue without their prior consent is illegal; b) the
potential for intrusion should be assessed not at the time of
collection of the sample, but when said sample is used; c) the
intrusion may be justified in some cases due to extraordinary
circumstances, such as the need to obtain relevant genetic
information to prove that certain events took place and provide
equitable evidence for a legal case; and d) when a person is
subjected to any kind of justified genetic privacy intrusion, he
should always be notified of it (a sub case of c).
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E. The Limits of Privacy Protection
This panorama is completed by the assessment of the
perplexities and limits surrounding the generalized application of
the privacy doctrine for the purpose of protecting genetic identity.
First of all, we should mention the concerns expressed by several
worldwide medical associations regarding the establishment of
generic genetic privacy regulations. In their opinion, these would
protect the patient but would also represent a major obstacle for
medical research.
From the same environment arises a somewhat myopic view,
one that would, on one hand emphasize some sort of genetic
existentialism, while on the other hand it proposes equal treatment
of genetic data, with no distinction between data worthy of legal
protection and data that is not. Specifically, as far as the insurance
and employment worlds are concerned, it would be useful to
identify and limit the scope of information employers and
insurance providers may legally obtain.
It is true that by acquiring genetic information about their
respective insured persons and workers these entities would be
able to attain various types of cost reductions, and better plan their
activities. This notwithstanding, it is also true that said access
could constitute a violation of the privacy of those same
individuals.
PART II
SEARCHING FOR OTHER DOCTRINES
Much of the doctrine and the jurisprudence of the US maintains
that an adequate form of protection for an individual's genetic
information can be found in the methods used to regulate other
types of medical information, which mandate that no data may be
collected or disseminated without the informed prior consent of the
subject it pertains to. 34 In this fashion, genetic information would
34. For a synthesis of said trends, see for example, Henry Miller III, DNA
Blueprints, Personhood and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 179 (1998),
that resorts to philosophical discourses to prove that the identity and
individuality of a person do not coincide with the store of genetic information
contained in DNA. According to this train of thought therefore, this data would
only have mere medical value and should be regulated accordingly. Said trend
is in opposition with that of the so called genetic exceptionalism, according to
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be protected as well as medical data tout court, and would fall
under the owner's privacy rights, meaning that the owner would
have the right to control the management and diffusion of said
information, 35 in accordance with the traditional concept of the
right to privacy formulated by Warren and Brandeis. 36
This legislative option however has proven itself to be an
inadequate solution to the delicate issue of effective protection of
genetic information. This is due to the peculiarities that connote
this type of information and the values inherent thereto (e.g., the
identity of the person, protection of individual dignity, etc.). The
inadequacy of privacy protection is especially evident in view of
three specific issues: (a) the collection and storage of DNA
samples from innocent people; (b) the collection and storage of
what is commonly known as “abandoned DNA”; and, (c) the issue
of the “biologic group.”
A. Collection and Storage of DNA Samples from Innocent
Individuals
Scientific progress has not only made it possible to gather
“physical” samples of DNA, but it has also given us the ability to
create, using specialized programs, a series of DNA profiles that
can be stored in specialized data banks. 37 While the usefulness of
this data is unquestionable, especially for investigative purposes,
some of the techniques used by public authorities have created

which genetic information constitutes a unicum, and as such should be subject to
ad hoc discipline. See on the subject: Deborah L. McLochlin, Whose genetic
information is it anyway? A Legal Analysis of the Effects that Mapping the
Human Genome Will Have on Privacy Rights and Genetic Discrimination, 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 609 (2001).
35. See, for example, Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property:
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
737 (2004); R.A. Curley & L.M. Caperna, The Brave New World Is Here:
Privacy Issues and the Human Genome, 70 DEF. COUNS, J. 22 (2003). Within
the case law, for example, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
616 (1989); and, lastly United States v. Kinkade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
36. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 193.
37. See, for example, Michael J. Malinowski, Taking Genomics to the
Biobank: Access to Human Biological Samples and Medical Information, 66 LA.
L. REV. 43 (2005) (focusing on the legal implications of storing human
biological material in biobanks).
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many doubts regarding the constitutional legitimacy of mass
gathering and storing data and information of such a delicate
nature.
Some of these activities are in fact conducted by means of a
technique named dragnet (which, figuratively speaking, means
“trawling”). When performed on a large scale for investigative
purposes, it gives the authorities the ability to gather, analyze and
archive genetic information on a multitude of individuals, the
majority of whom have no penal record, or have never been
connected to any potential criminal activity. 38 Consequently, once
the investigative purpose has been concluded, and the criminal
identified, the authorities find themselves in possession of vast
amounts of sensitive information that, aside from its former
investigative value, may be of interest to many other entities (such
as insurance companies, administrative agencies, and
employers). 39 Since current legislative measures and previous
legal rulings do not seem to offer adequate protection in this
context, there is a trend of thought that advocates addressing the
issue by means of a paradigm similar to the one already instituted
to protect privacy. Specifically, such a trend seems to favor
granting to individuals that provide genetic information some type
of actual ownership right, therefore affirming that they would hold
the proprietary rights for the data.
Such an option would allow for the vigorous reaffirmation of
constitutional guarantees of protection for the rights of individuals,
the efficacy of which would actually be paralyzed if the norms that
regulate privacy were to be used. 40 In order to better understand
the juridical implications of this debate, we must closely examine
the subject matter itself. As stated, the collection of DNA samples
38. See infra note 47.
39. See, for example, the critical remarks of Michael J. Markett, Note,
Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185 (1996).
40. Examples of the large portion of the doctrine that favors the institution
of actual protection measures founded on the recognition of proprietary rights
for genetic data versus personal rights, based on the privacy rights, are among
others: Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory,
87 NW. U. L. REV. 1037 (1992); and recently, Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy
Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of DNA
Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 187 (2004). There is no lack of decidedly
antagonistic views, for example, Suter, supra note 35. The question will be
specifically addressed in the paragraph that follows.
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and the creation of an ensuing genetic profile have assumed a
fundamental role in investigative environments. The process that
leads to the identification and incrimination of the perpetrator of a
crime is conducted in four steps: 41 the DNA must be collected
from the scene of the crime, and analyzed; 42 the investigative
authorities, on their part, must compile the profile of the potential
crime perpetrator, and select the individuals from which DNA
samples should be obtained; DNA samples are collected from
selected individuals; and the samples so obtained must then be
analyzed and transformed into an equivalent number of profiles to
be compared with the profile obtained from the sample collected at
the crime scene. After this process is concluded, and after all the
investigative venues have been exhausted, the question of whether
to store or destroy the collected samples arises. 43
As can be noted, one of the crucial stages in this process
involves the ability to obtain a series of DNA samples from
members of a selected group and compare them with the sample
collected from the crime scene. Another fundamental factor is the
selection of the group of individuals from which to obtain DNA.
Traditionally the authorities selected these individuals by availing
themselves of various methods. First of all, legislation was
instituted at state level to impose ex lege the collection of DNA
from individuals known to have committed violent crimes.
Recently, many states have expanded the parameters that apply to
the collection of genetic material by passing ad hoc legislation.
Some states actually also allow for collection of DNA samples of
people convicted of non-violent murders, meaning lesser crimes.
Other states provide for mandatory collection upon a simple arrest,
prior to the actual determination of the individual's guilt.44
41. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit:
DNA Databases for 21st Century Crime Control? 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000).
42. The nature of DNA is such that there is a high level of probability of
finding “genetic material” left by the person that committed the murder at the
scene. Everyone knows that, in fact, DNA is found in the blood, skin cells,
tissues, organs, muscles, brain cells, bones, hair, saliva, mucus, nails, urine and
human sperm. Id.
43. Id.
44. For further details see SETH AXELRAD, SPECIAL REPORT: SURVEY OF
STATE DNA DATABASE STATUTES (2005), that can be found on the following
web address web: http://www.aslme.org/ (last visited November 6, 2008).
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Lately, a forth technique of genetic material sampling has
gained popularity. It is called DNA dragnets, meaning massive
“trawling” of DNA samples from subjects that fall within a group
that is deemed potentially relevant for the investigation. This
selection criteria uses parameters so broad that the connection to
the crime committed usually loses much of its significance. 45 The
implementation of this technique has raised major concerns. While
in the first three instances the collection and storage of the DNA
samples appears to be constitutionally legitimate according to the
search and seizure clause contained in the Fourth Amendment of
the US Constitution, 46 there have been many questions raised
regarding the constitutional legitimacy of DNA samples obtained
using dragnets. 47
Since, generally, the “trawling” occurs with the consent of the
subjects, the constitutional rights of the Fourth Amendment can not
be applied. 48 The voluntary basis of this consent however, appears
to be rather weak, certainly not one that is strong enough to
overcome the predicament of the above mentioned constitutional
rights issue, considering that, if the individual refuses to give his
DNA, 49 the authorities can obtain a court order that obligates said
45. A paradoxical example, yet one that is apt to understand the import of
the phenomena and the constitutional implications thereof, could be one where
DNA dragnets are performed on all of male individuals of Caucasian ancestry
that live in a State, for the purpose of looking for the perpetuator of a rape. See
Fred W. Drobner, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA
Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479 (2000), according to whom
dragnets are essentially “perquisitions with no mandates, mass conducted on
multitudes of individuals, whose only tie to the crime is the authorities’
suspicion that they belong to a class of subjects that could possibly have
committed that crime”.
46. See infra contained in the text.
47. See, for example, Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnets–A Constitutional
Catch, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 15 (2005).
48. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001).
49. It must be highlighted that such a collection of sampling, thanks to the
scientific progress and to the circumstance that the DNA is present in many
human tissues, is usually carried out by means of a wood stick with a cottonmade end which is simply rubbed inside the mouth of a person, in order to
absorb the saliva. Therefore, the circumstance that the technique applied to
collect such sampling is not intrusive at all, seems to have weakened the
arguments of who used to deem such a method as a form of physical intrusion,
with prejudice to the individual. See, for example, M.A. Rothstein & S.
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person to undergo sampling, on the basis that he refused to
cooperate with the investigation. 50 In this regard however, it may
be best to make a distinction. The collection of biologic material is
only the initial phase of the analysis process. Once the material
has been obtained, it will have to be processed in order to extract
its DNA profile.
The DNA sample thus obtained will then be transformed into a
DNA profile (commonly compared to some type of digital print)
and this profile will be used for investigative purposes. 51 The
process of comparing genetic information obtained from the crime
scene to that of the samples collected pertains exclusively to the
DNA profile, and is totally independent from the storage of the
organic material the sample was derived from (blood, saliva, hair,
etc.). On the other hand, the fact that organic material containing
an individual’s DNA is accessible could allow someone to obtain
highly sensitive genetic information concerning said individual, for
purposes that are extraneous to actual investigative needs. For
example, analysis of DNA samples could reveal personal
information concerning predisposition to more than four thousand
different illnesses and hereditary conditions; the propensity
towards a certain sexual orientation, predisposition to become
addicted to some narcotic drugs or other substances (for example,
the tendency to become an alcoholic) and, according to some, any
criminal tendencies. 52
Vice versa, since a DNA profile really only consists of a
sequence of numbers, it can only be used for identification
purposes and is not apt as a mean by which to discover any
relevant information concerning the peculiarities of each

Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement
DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127 (2001).
50. See Drobner, supra note 45, at 508; and Imwinkelried & Kaye supra
note 48, at 423-24.
51. On this and other aspects pertaining to the manipulation of DNA, see
R.A. Nakashima, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trias: A Defense’s Attorney
Primer, 74 NEB. L. REV. 444, 447-50 (1995).
52. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L.
REV. 413.
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individual. 53 For this reason, the DNA profile can be intended as
being an investigative tool. 54
In this context, all fifty states have adopted laws that authorize
the storage of DNA profiles of anyone that has been convicted of a
crime in the appropriate data archives. To integrate the activities
that occurred at the state level, in 1994 the US Congress issued the
DNA Identification Act, 55 which authorizes the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to create a federal reference system that
centralizes all of the DNA-profiles contained in the national
archives. This activity led to the creation of the National DNA
Index System, a national database that allows local authorities and
administrative agencies to contribute DNA profiles in their
possession. The system thus created allows administrative and
state authorities to use and share data originated from the collective
databases, and is known as the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS). 56
As briefly mentioned, in the US the cause of major concern,
and the object of the current debate, is the legitimacy of storing the
organic material (the DNA profile) of an individual after the
investigative requirements of identifying the perpetrator and
obtaining a conviction have been satisfied. It is notable that, while
one side asserts that it is legal to preserve the DNA profile of a
person who has been convicted of a crime, and the other side states
that there are still doubts regarding the legitimacy of also
preserving organic materials taken from those subjects, or vice
versa, almost everyone agrees that the overall issue of storing the

53. Id.
54. In this regard, the American doctrine agrees that due to the regulation of
“specification” (such a juridical concept can be compared to the Italian
“specificazione” as a peculiar way to acquire property rights on a thing), the
proprietor of the DNA-profile should be the investigative authorities. Recently,
Harlan, supra note 40. In particular, an Italian scholar admits that there is the
possibility that the norms on specifications may be applied to the subject of the
legal relationship between the individual, the body and the parts of the body. See
Gambaro, infra note 106, at 45. Otherwise, it could be argued that the rules
concerning intellectual property and copyrights might be applied to such an
issue.
55. 42 U.S.C. 14, 312 (2000).
56. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
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DNA samples of innocent people is a genuine “constitutional
emergency.” 57
The debate is also fueled by the notable discrepancies that exist
between the laws of different states. At least twenty-nine states
have adopted legislative measures that expressly authorize
preserving the DNA samples in debate. 58 In contrast, only five
states expressly prohibit the preservation of samples once the DNA
profile comparison has been completed, 59 while at least eleven
states have yet to adopt any measures on the subject. 60 As
previously highlighted, part of American doctrine is of the opinion
that the issue should be re-conducted to the right of privacy and to
the constitutional status that said principle accords.
B. The Limitations of the Privacy Doctrine and the Affirmation of
the Proprietary Paradigm
In this regard, it should be noted that the most significant
systemization of the American right of privacy is contained in the
celebrated essay of Warren and Brandeis, followed by other
doctrinal contributions of remarkable prestige, together with a
series of jurisprudential precedents that acted upon those same
lines. 61 As far as specific legislative measures, the Constitution
57. Id. and Iraola, supra note 47.
58. Among these for example we can cite: Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington State.
59. Alaska, California, Montana, New York, and Vermont.
60. For further details, see Jonathan Kimmelmann, Risking Ethical
Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 209 (2000).
61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24. Warren was a well known lawyer
from Boston, while Brandeis eventually became a Judge of the US Supreme
Court. In synthesis, within their publication–defined as “perhaps the most
famous and certainly the most influential article of doctrine ever written”
[LANDMARKS OF LAW, HIGHLIGHTS OF LEGAL OPINION 284 (Henson ed. 1960)],
the authors tried to demonstrate that the Common Law, within a collection of old
decisions, thanks to the recourse to different doctrines, had in the end
recognized the existence of a general sphere of privacy rights, or of a right to
privacy worthy of protecting. Among the decisions that were inspired by said
premise we can recall specifically a verdict of the Supreme Court of the State of
Georgia, that distinguished itself because of its strongly convincing opinion on
behalf of such a theory: Pavesich v. New England Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.
68 (1905). For an initial in depth elaboration of the rights of persons from the
comparative point of view, see 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ,
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does not acknowledge any type of privacy right in any of its
articles, or in the Bill of Rights, the fulcrum of the fundamental
rights granted to individuals. 62 Nonetheless, the route followed by
the legal interpreters while striving to institute a constitutionally
warranted privacy right involved their having to resort to the
substantive due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, and the so called theory of penumbra. 63

INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO (INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW)
396, 415 (E. Cigna trans., 1995).
62. The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791 and it comprises the first ten
Amendments of the American Constitution. Other Amendments were approved
later: the last Amendment in particular (XXVII)–concerning retribution for the
members of Congress–was approved in 1992. For further details on the history
of the American Constitution, refer to WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 7 (3rd ed, West
Group 2002). In this regards, we remind you that originally the Bill of Rights
was formulated as being applicable only to the Federal authorities. In the 1960',
the Supreme Court began issuing a series of decisions, which ruled that the
applicability of guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, issued in
1868, should be extended to include the activities of the individual States. Id.
63. According to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment a person shall not
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. Common
agreement on this subject is that the Amendment includes two distinct notions of
due process: the first–named procedural due process–would consist of the
guarantee directly derived from text of the Amendment, the second–called
substantive due process–would postulate the existence of specific personal
rights, comprised in the notion of “liberty.” This is when, among others in the
shadow of the right to freedom law, the existence of an actual right to privacy
was acknowledged, its existence was vigorously sustained in two leading cases
on the topic of birth control and abortion. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1969) the Federal Supreme Court ruled that a State law prohibiting the use
of all means of birth control was unconstitutional, based in fact on the right to
privacy of individuals, which–the majority of opinion argued–was to be intended
to be in “the shadow” of the guarantees expressly recognized by the Bill of
Rights. This right therefore gave married couples the freedom to use means of
birth control. Subsequently, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)–a case that
directly involved the issue of abortion, the same Court's majority opinion,
instead of referring to the Bill of Rights uti universus, substantiated the ruling by
anchoring the foundations of the right to privacy to the substantive due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. In synthesis, the Court deemed that said right
was also inclusive of the right to abortion; at the same time however, it
recognized the existence of two conflicting interests equally worth protecting:
the matter of the mother's health and the fostering of potential human life. In
view of this, the gestation period was divided into three trimesters, each of them
characterized by the prevalence of one of the above mentioned interests. The
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Although the genesis of the right to privacy in the American
legal system may lie, as noted, in the Fifth Amendment, at a
constitutional level the source of the protection afforded under the
right to privacy, as well as its applicable limitations, nonetheless
lies in the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. 64
In fact, recent jurisprudence strengthened the connection between
the right to privacy and the above Amendment to the point that it is
now regarded as being the core value of this last. 65

right to privacy was also invoked to protect some of the aspects of family and
marital life. Hence a zoning regulation was deemed to be unconstitutional, on
the basis that it violated the right to privacy of the family, because it specified
that housing in a certain area was to be used exclusively by families composed
of parents and children, which implied that families whose composition
extended to include other relatives such as grandparents, could not inhabit it.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In contrast, it was
ruled that the right to privacy does not extend to include acts of consensual
sodomy performed by a homosexual couple within the privacy of their own
home. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986): at this junction, the subject to
be examined by a Court was a law from the State of Georgia that prohibited the
performance of those acts. That law was subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of that State, because it was deemed to
be contrary to the dispositions of the State constitution. Powell v. State, 510
S.E. 2d 18 (Ga. 1999). Finally, in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept.
Of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), it was argued that the right to privacy
encompassed also a “right to die:” Nancy Cruzan was an irreversible coma
patient. Her parents sought to remove of the tube that provided her with
artificial nutrition, so that she may be allowed to die a natural death. The
Supreme Court ruled that artificial nutrition is a medical treatment method, and
as such can be discontinued to satisfy an person’s wish to die with dignity. In
this case, however, the law of the State of Missouri–that imposed a very high
probationary standard on the interruption of medical treatment–was not deemed
to be unconstitutional in recognition of the fact that it ensued from the State's
strong intent to preserve human life. In 1997 the question of “the right to die”
was revisited, and this time said right morphed into the “right to assisted death.”
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
64. The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution prescribes:
. . . the right of the people to be secure in their persons, house,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall be issued, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
65. For illustrative examples of these movements see Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994).
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees pertaining to the
inviolability of a person, dwellings and personal property is not,
however, absolute. Instead, as clearly enunciated in the written
content of the clause, 66 it may be subjected to limitations, upon
condition that these last are reasonable and within the scope of the
formal requirements established therein. Therefore, for example, a
house can only be searched after obtaining a warrant ad hoc from
the appropriate authorities, etc. 67
Besides reasons that meet the formal and substantive
requirements to restrict the rights granted by the said Amendment,
another factor that nullifies the inviolability of that right is the
subject’s consent. Obviously, consent must be freely given, and as
such not granted under any form of coercion, or at least not given
as a result of false statements made by public officials. 68
Another element worth considering is the important question of
what exactly is intended by the word search. In fact, whenever the
actions undertaken do not constitute a “search” in the technical
sense, the rights accorded by the Fourth Amendment cannot be
enforced. Originally, the opinion was that matters of this kind
66. See supra note 64.
67. Additionally, it was ruled that it is legal to conduct a search without a
warrant, if extraordinary circumstances arise (for example, for an emergency
situation of such nature that it was objectively impossible for the authorities to
obtain a warrant in advance). See Illinois v. Mc Arthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
Another ruling exception that was peacefully accepted was the legitimate arrest
of a citizen: in this junction, the public officials that perform the arrest have not
only the right but the duty to conduct a search (for example, to verify that the
subject is unarmed or to prevent him from destroying evidence, i.e. bags of
drugs in the case of a drug dealer's arrest). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969). This right encompasses not only searching the arrested person, but
also his/her house, car, etc.; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
68. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) the officers in charge
of the search told the homeowner–untruthfully–that they possessed a legal
search warrant. The woman then gave them permission to come in. During the
Court proceedings, when the defense lawyer objected to the lack of a warrant,
and argued that the search was therefore illegal, the public prosecutor replied
that the search was rendered legal by the explicit consent of the subject thereto.
The US Supreme Court ruled that said consent was invalid because it was
obtained under coercion, specifically “by acquiescence to a claim of a lawful
authority.” In any case, it should be mentioned that public officials are not
required to inform the subjects of their right to withhold consent. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 543 (1968).
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could be settled only under the hypothesis of physical intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area. 69 For example, in 1928 the
US Supreme Court ruled that using a phone tap device to record a
subject’s incriminating phone conversations did not fall under the
criteria of search; since a conversation per se can not be intended
as being a tangible object, it could not be said that an actual form
of physical intrusion onto a constitutionally protected area 70 had
taken place.
The court abandoned this “tangible” criterion only in 1967,
with the leading case Katz v. United States, 71 which also pertained
to the issue of phone taps, and elaborated the criteria of reasonable
expectation of privacy. Specifically, the ruling established that the
act of placing an electronic device on an external wall of a public
phone booth, for the purpose of intercepting telephone
conversations, constituted an actual search and is subject to the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that it occurred in a
public place was deemed to be irrelevant, based upon the fact that
the provisions contained in the Fourth Amendment were
formulated to protect the rights of individuals, and not of locations.
What the provisions were meant to protect as “private” should
have been respected whether the scene of the intrusion was
considered public or not. Since Mr. Katz had a reasonable
expectation that his phone conversations would remain private, the
interception constituted an actual search, and, in order to perform
said search, the investigators should have obtained an ad hoc
warrant in advance.
As can be noted, the ruling marked the shift from an approach
based on substance to a personalistic one. A contrario, meaning
what individuals willingly disclose to the public, even while in
their homes or in their offices, falls outside of the circle of
protections granted by the Fourth Amendment. 72
In spite of the revaluations caused by the Katz case, the court,
in a subsequent case, pronounced a ruling based on the tangible
physical intrusion criteria, reintroducing the open fields doctrine,

69. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
71. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72. Id.
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which had been seemingly overruled. 73 The expression open field
is intended to describe the stretch of terrain that is on the outside of
the curtilage of a dwelling. Specifically, this includes the plot of
land on top of which a dwelling was built, and it includes all the
facilities it may contain (such as garages, verandas, access paths,
lawns, flower beds, etc.). 74 The principle affirmed by the court
was that the open field could not guarantee the privacy of those
activities that the Fourth Amendment meant to protect from
interference and surveillance conducted by public authorities. 75
The rational parameters of said movement were for the most
part founded on the consideration that, although in theory the
legitimacy of those intrusions is questionable, in reality the
associated entities generally tend to make allowances in these
areas. One last hypothesis deserves to be considered: that of trash.
According to the court, trash is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment, because “plastic bags of refuse, left on or along
public roads, can be easily accessed by animals, children, refuse
collectors, the curious and anyone else.” Because of this, “the
owners cannot claim to hold a subjective expectation of privacy,
that society can accept as being objectively reasonable,” 76 with this
recalling the arguments a contrario deducible by the Katz 77 case.

73. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). The so called “open field
doctrine” was mentioned for the first time in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924).
74. In the case of a country home, curtilage indicates the area of ground that
surrounds a dwelling, but it does not pertain to the whole parcel of land. See
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S: VOCABULARY OF ENGLISH (last ed.).
75. Therefore the actions of the police, which consisted of walking around
the lot and discovering the existence of marijuana plants via a gap in the fence at
the back of the property, did not constitute a search, and as such did not require
a warrant, regardless of the fact that said plants were not visible from the road in
front of the house. Along the same parameters, United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294 (1987).
76. California v. Grenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988): in the case de quo, the
police, who suspected the homeowner was selling narcotics, checked the
garbage left just outside of the curtilage of a dwelling. The Court ruled this
action did not constitute a search in the technical sense, and as such did not
necessitate a warrant. The accent was posed particularly on the fact that the
rubbish was left in a public area for the deliberate purpose of consigning it to a
third party–in charge of the collection–who would have been able to go through
the garbage himself, or allow someone else to do so i.e. the police.
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and the corresponding text.
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The court’s decision constitutes a specific application of the
open fields doctrine. The motive for the verdict, however,
postulates the recall of a distinct juridical institution: property
rights. 78 In synthesis, according to the court, abandoning goods
outside of one's own sphere of jurisdiction (limited to the area that
can be qualified as being curtilage) suggests that someone is
willingly renouncing their rights thereto, and a fortiori, the right to
exercise any form of control over these goods which, therefore,
acquire the status of res derelictae. 79
78. On this subject, we must keep in mind the caveat mentioned by A.
Gambaro in regards to the ambiguity of the term “property” and the risks that
would be encountered while doing a comparative investigation whereas the term
“property” was to be translated into the Italian term proprietà; this would lead to
the suppression of precious juridical situations connected to said term both
within the Common law itself and along the lines of the less prominent category
of “diritti reali” (i.e. rights on a thing) of the Italian legal system. ALBINA.
CANDIAN, ANTONIO GAMBARO, & BARBARA POZZO, PROPERTY, PROPRIÉTÉ,
EIGENTUM, 3 (1992). The same author also highlights the possible connotations
of the juridical language, as pertaining to property, also as viewed from within
the same legal system (from example, in American Law, the concept of
“property” and the reference sources vary between the ones obtained from
approaching the issue of rights protection from a Constitutional standpoint
against the inhibiting actions of the public authorities or whether the subject is
approached in order to discuss the issues concerning the transfer of titled
property rights). In view of these considerations, the same author proposes to
“refer to the central nucleus of the ownership issue, considering the different
disciplines as being the blade-like solutions that originate from an individual key
issue, or rather, establish which subject has the most potential to be useful, be
enjoyed and is flexible enough to allow for the expansion or disposal of objects
in our collection that can directly satisfy life’s needs.” As a result of this
approach, the proprietary discipline would then be “assumed independently of
the categories it derived from, meaning the group of regulations that dictate
what the subjects that are authorized to act in regards to an item and, on the
contrary, determine everything that the other subjects should do, not do or
tolerate in regards to that same item.” Id., Proprietà in diritto comparato
(Property in Comparative Law), in XV DIGESTO DISC. PRIV. 504-506 (1997).
For an analysis of the challenges inherent to juridical translation, as well as the
various options available to those who wish to study a foreign legal system, refer
also to the brilliant suggestions of Rodolfo Sacco, Traduzione giuridica,
DIGESTO DISC. PRIV., Aggiornamento 722 (2000); and to those of OLIVIER
MORÉTEAU, DROIT ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES (Précis Dalloz 2000), whose analysis
focused mainly on the language issues within business relationships.
Accordingly, during the present analysis, references made to the property
paradigm shall be viewed from the standpoint of the preceding observations.
79. In a previous verdict, the Court's ruling was based upon bona vacantia,
deeming that the conduct of police officers, who looked through the trash of a
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Although it may appear to have been initially neglected, the
paradigm of ownership started to resurface with all of its might in
the debate pertaining to the fundamental rights of the individual
and their limits of applicability. What we wish to highlight is the
fact that, although rights such as privacy and ownership are
connected, they are addressed autonomously and separately, with
different regulatory legislation. Having concluded the detailed
examination of privacy doctrine’s jurisprudential evolution, we can
now address the constitutional implications that pertain to the
collection and storage of DNA samples. Specifically, we will try to
verify if applying the regulations of the privacy protection laws to
the delicate matter of genetic information is the best and most
efficient option by which to direct them, or if, as the doctrine
already proffered, it may be preferable to grant each individual
ownership rights over this information, rights that would be
constitutionally guaranteed and protected with ad hoc measures.
We must premise the discussion of this subject with an
important distinction. As previously stated, whenever a sample of
DNA belonging to an individual that has been convicted of a crime
is collected or stored, these activities appear to be constitutionally
legitimate, since they are conducted in accordance with the formal
and procedural guarantees prescribed by the Fourth Amendment
(noting that the constitutional legitimacy of State regulations has
never been questioned). As far as what pertains more specifically
to the dragnets phenomena, the constitutional legitimacy of that
practice is guaranteed by the subject’s consent, who voluntarily
decides to authorize collection of a sample of their DNA under
conditions, of course, that do not involve any form of coercion or
false statements on the investigative authorities’ part. 80 In this
regard, it seems appropriate to recall that in the context of the
practice of dragnets, the consensual element tends to lose its
efficacy due to the fact that if when confronted with the rightful
refusal of the subject, the appropriate authorities can be petitioned
to issue an order that effectively coerces that person into agreeing

hotel room to verify if the suspect was indeed using narcotics, did not constitute
a “search,” but in fact, the trash was an example of bona vacantia.
80. On the topic see supra the opinions listed in supra note 34, and the
corresponding text.
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to the DNA sample 81 collection. In both instances–voluntary and
coerced consent–the limitations imposed by the Fourth
Amendment are inapplicable, and as a consequence, the privacy
rights are nullified. 82 Consequently, the genetic material acquired
by means of dragnets is no longer covered by the constitutional
privacy right. 83 The above conclusion is vulnerable to critique
when it fails to consider that the issue being examined, as
previously indicated, involves two distinct events: the collection
of genetic material, and, once the investigative needs are
exhausted, its subsequent storage. There is no doubt that both
voluntary and mandated consent, in the instance of biological
material collection (and the processing needed to extract a DNA
profile), 84 result in the invalidation of the subject's privacy rights.
Conversely, it is highly debatable that the effects of the consent or
injunction can also be considered an implicit authorization for the
final–ulterior and distinct–purpose of storing the genetic material
for an indefinite amount of time, and, for example, consent to its
being potentially used in an investigation connected to a different
crime. The consent to the subsequent storage of the sample could
be documented, meaning it could be specifically addressed within
the above named official mandates. In that case however, the
validity of the consent may become an issue. It seems unlikely that
the subjects consenting to the indefinite storage of their DNA
sample can be considered as having done so while duly informed,
since future scientific advances could render DNA samples able to
fulfill purposes that were inconceivable at the time said consent
was given. On the other hand, as far as the court injunction is
concerned, the constitutional legitimacy of the provision could be
81. See supra note 50, and the corresponding text.
82. According to the teachings of Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at
218, “the right to privacy is extinguished by the effects of divulging the
information pertaining to the individual, or by the consent of this last.”
83. About this see the concerns mentioned by Iraola, supra note 47.
84. We must also consider the fact that, while a DNA profile is rendered by
a sequence of numbers, only apt to serve as identification for investigative
means, genetic information obtainable through biologic materials is highly
sensitive by nature and can be used for a multitude of purposes. In this regard,
see the n. 18-23 and their corresponding text and, in particular, Michael J.
Malinowski & Radhika Rao, Legal Limitations of Genetic Research and the
Commercialization of Its Results, 54 AM. J. COMP. LAW 45 (2006) (analyzing
the economic and financial implications of the developments occurred within the
biopharmaceutical and biotechnological field).
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contested on the basis of the alleged public reasonableness thereof,
as referenced in the Fourth Amendment. 85
Aside from the above observations, we must keep in mind that
these legal situations are totally independent and distinct from the
initial collection and the analysis of genetic data. This necessitates
conducting two separate assessments of the factors that nullify the
constitutional provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Waiving the
privacy rights concerning the collection of the DNA sample does
not involve, ipso iure, the willingness to forego privacy rights
concerning the subsequent storage thereof. 86
This specific issue, for example, has been expressly addressed
in The Netherlands, where there has been a debate concerning the
legal status of the human biological material as a consequence of
the fact that, due to recent developments in genetics, the
preservation of DNA samples in specific data banks has become
customary. In this regard, in spite of the fact that the issue seems
to have been addressed from the privacy right perspective, the
property and privacy paradigms appear to be strictly intertwined.
In particular, the debate focused on the status of human biological
material stored in those data banks is unclear and implies the risk
of violating the donor’s rights. Accordingly, the enactment of
regulations has been strongly recommended to clarify the purpose
of the cell bank, the time period for which the material may be
kept, and the possible uses of the material. 87 In this regard, it has
been suggested to strengthen the consent argument by imposing
upon keepers of DNA samples the duty to require ad hoc and time
by time informed consent from the owners of such material, not
only for present applications but also for future ones. In addition,
the individual to whom the DNA sample pertains to should be
entitled to request full information about the use and the status of
his/her DNA sample and even to exercise the right to have that
sample destroyed. 88 Those last remarks show how the property
paradigm plays an important role in spite of an approach which at
85. Ref. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of
Context: Implications for the Social Meaning of Genetic Information and
Individual Identity, 47 S. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 445-446 (2003).
86. On the topic see Harlan, supra note 40, at 192.
87. See in particular Joke I. De Witte & Jos V.M. Welie, The status of
genetic material and genetic information in The Netherlands, 45 SOC. SCI. MED.
1 (1997).
88. Id. at 47.
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first sight is oriented in favor of the privacy doctrine. In fact, it has
been held by part of the doctrine that keepers of the DNA data
banks should be deemed as being in the same position as that of
the owner of a storage facility, who, after all, does not own what is
stored. On the contrary, the individual to whom the DNA sample
belongs would retain the ownership of that sample. 89
In view of the observations made so far, we could deduce that,
as long as great care is taken to respect the sensitivity of the
subject matter, the right to privacy laws could be employed to
adequately protect the genetic information of an individual. As
premised, this is the direction taken by the currently prevailing
doctrine, 90 and has seemingly been endorsed by the legislative
bodies as well. 91
This being said, other scholars consider this legislative
approach to be totally inadequate due to the intrinsic limits of
privacy protection laws, and in view of the unique traits of genetic
information itself. Specifically, arguments proffered by the
supporters of said orientation (which is certainly not a minority
trend) are founded on the following observations:
(i) The obsolete nature of the reasonable expectation of
privacy criteria. According to the prevailing judicial interpretation
of this formula, in order to maintain said expectation, an individual
should not sign checks (since they are legal instruments destined to
be circulated), nor should that person conduct telephone
conversations or walk around his neighborhood. Further, once
home, this individual should take care to shutter all windows, to
eliminate each and every fissure, and speak softly while
conversing; 92
(ii) The tendency to accord public opinion an important role in
the judgment of the bearing of opposite interests, with the

89. Id. at 46-48.
90. Compare with n. 1 and 2 and the corresponding text.
91. These anchor the protection of genetic information to the privacy
doctrine, for example: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 (Pub. L. no. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 42 & 29 U.S.C.); and the
Standards for Privacy of Individual Identifiable Health Information, issued by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 82,
461; 45 C.F.R., pts. 160 & 164).
92. Specifically, Sundby, supra note 65, at 1789-1790.
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subsequent, progressive weakening of the inviolable nature of the
right being examined. 93
Specifically in regards to genetic information, the inadequacy
of the prevailing privacy protection laws are fully revealed once
the information is “unveiled.” For example, we may think about
an instance where a doctor analyses a DNA sample to determine if
the patient is predisposed to develop a certain ailment. In the
American legal system, the doctor-patient relationship is among
those classified as being confidential relationships, meaning a type
of legal relationship whose connotations have a very strong
fiduciary element, and is intrinsically intuitu personae by nature. 94
This dictates that the doctor, as recipient of the patient's trust, is
bound to abide to a series of specific obligations in addition to
those traditionally attributed to a standard contractual relationship.
Chief among said obligations–at least for the purposes of this
work–is to maintain the confidentiality of any information
acquired. 95
What is most dreaded by the privacy doctrine critics is the risk
that DNA samples taken for medical reasons, and their pertaining
genetic information, may be subsequently passed on to official
authorities and then be used for investigative purposes. The
protection offered by the prescription that prevents disclosure of
that information is not, in fact, absolute. The acts of acquiring and
using highly confidential information do not constitute, according
to a US Supreme Court ruling, a violation of the constitutional
rights granted to an individual. This was observed in a 1976 ruling
that stated:
93. Id.
94. A confidential relationship involves parties in different contractual
positions: from within said special relationship. The individual that assumes a
so called dependent role must be identified; this would be the person who
legally confides in the counterpart, who is defined in turn as being the dominant
party, and consequently trusts in the judgment of this last, believing that this
individual will act in the best interest of the first party. J.D. CALAMARI & J.M.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS 353 § 9-10 (Thomson-West ed., 5th ed. 2003); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 738 § 106 (5th
ed, 1984).
95. For a specific application of the discipline being examined in regards to
genetic information, see the latest work by Susan M. Denbo, What Your Genes
Know Affects Them: Should Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of
Genetic Test Results to a Patient’s Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 561
(2006).
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This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed 96
In this regard, it should be noted that the appointed courts
applied this principle specifically to the collection of biologic
material samples, deeming that the actions of health institutions,
who forwarded samples of genetic material–collected for medical
reasons, with the legal consent of the subject–to investigative
authorities, did not constitute a violation of the constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy. 97
Lastly, there is another argument that exposes the inadequacy
of using privacy rights legislation as an instrument by which to
protect genetic information. As briefly suggested previously, 98
DNA resides in many types of human tissue, easily acquired even
in public places (let's consider the examples of hair or saliva left on
a cup at a coffee shop). The “public” nature of DNA effectively
weakens the expectation of an individual who believes he/she is
the only one that has access to, or can determine the use of, said
information. Therefore, the peculiar nature of DNA effectively
lowers the level of what can be perceived as a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The complexities pertaining to the issue at
hand become truly evident when applied to the case of
“abandoned DNA,” the principal topic of discussion in the section
that follows.
Due to the asserted inadequacy of the regulating genetic
information by means of the privacy doctrine, a new direction,
previously outlined, has appeared on the horizon of American
96. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
97. For example, People v. Perlos, 462 N.W. 2d 310, 324 (Mich. 1990).
These trends seem to infringe upon the validity of the theory sustained by the
doctrine, according to which, in order to guarantee the efficacious protection of
the individual genetic privacy, we must emphasize the confidential nature of that
information and the importance of the element of trust in the relationship
between the owner of the information and the recipient thereof, instead of
resorting to a property right based paradigm. Suter, supra note 35, fully agrees
with this opinion.
98. See supra note 42.
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legislation. This favors endowing an individual with actual
property rights over his genetic information. This option, it is said,
would be more effective in protecting the individual from illicit
intrusions upon his sphere of intimate genetic information and, on
the other hand, would also serve to duly recognize the peculiar
nature of this information, and the values that pertain thereto (i.e.,
the identity of individuals, protection of the dignity of individuals,
etc.) 99 The option in favor of the proprietary paradigm would
therefore be better because it would:
(i) Guarantee an ad hoc process for all of the possible
juridical scenarios that may arise in regards to this subject.
Different from the right to privacy, which seems to have been
modeled along rigid criteria and are reconducible to the double
binomials of “confidentiality of information-privacy” and
“disclosure of information-decrease of privacy,” the paradigm of
property rights–especially as denoted by Hohfeld's definition on
the merit of which is it has been greeted–seems to hold greater
flexibility and malleability. 100 The right in question is composed
of a number of authorities and powers, which can be restricted or
limited without abrogating the right itself. A specific application
of such a theory is, in fact, the so called “resilience of property
rights,” which imports that the scope of a right can be restricted,
99. See the observations made in Section 3, which follows.
100. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was the author of two influential articles
published in the Yale Law Journal, in which he identified and divided the
fundamental concepts used to describe legal relationships among parties, taking
care to also express the pertaining concepts in precise and rigorous terms
(Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal
Reasoning (I), 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); and Id., Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Legal Reasoning (II), 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1916)). The American
Law Institute adopted the orientation of Hohfeld as paradigm upon which to
structure the establishment of the Restatement of Property. The fulcrum of that
structure is truly the adoption of a concept of property as understood in
comparative terms regarding relationships, among which the notions of “right,”
“privilege,” “power” and “indemnification” are weighed against just as many
opposite concepts. The eventual limitations imposed upon one or more of these
relationships would not invalidate the object right. Recently within the doctrine
it was stated that “it is truly the metaphor of property as a range of rights
constitutes a more appropriate description of the way by which the majority of
these new acknowledged forms of property operate.” See Recent Cases, infra
note 134. For further elaborations on this point, see Barrad, supra note 40, at
1054; and Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995).
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then extended back to its original form without impediments (as
well as it happens in the Italian legal system about the so called
elasticità del dominio principle, according to which the right of
property significantly restricted by the concurrence on the same res
of another right, as for example the right of usufruct, can be
nevertheless expanded again when the latter has expired); 101
(ii) Give the person who owns the rights instruments of
authority more efficient than those offered by privacy protection
laws. In this case for example, it would allow the titled owner of
the biological material, and genetic information, the right to regain
possession of the sample after the investigative needs have been
met. Conversely, the protection offered by the right to privacy
legislation only extends to prescribing compensatory damages for
violations, and as such is inadequate to effectively protect the
individual after that right has been violated; 102
(iii) Offer constitutional guarantees for this right, and
specifically those granted by the Fifth Amendment. As previously
stated, the subject's consent, the actions of the pertaining
authorities, or the inability to adjust the threshold of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, cause the diminishment–if not the
obliteration–of the individual right to privacy. As a result, the
Fourth amendment provisions would not apply. Vice versa,
granting property rights over the “assets” in question would ensure
the ability to enforce the provisions contained in the Fifth
Amendment. Said Amendment provides that citizens cannot be
deprived of their property rights without due process of law, and it
also mandates that property cannot be seized for public use without
duly indemnifying the owner. For DNA dragnets, the principles of
due process of law and public use could be applied, while the
requisite of due indemnification would not be satisfied, as it would
be constitutionally illegal for the authorities to store DNA. 103
The question, as previously outlined, is in any case
controversial, and there is no lack of arguments supporting the
opposite theory. 104 These last can be summarized by a single

101. Id.
102. Harlan, supra note 40, at 215.
103. Id.
104. In this regard, see notes 34-35 and the corresponding text.
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theme: the fear of commercializing the human body, 105 which is
founded on the notions of alienability and the freedom to dispose
of goods, intrinsic to property laws. 106 This worry may be calmed
by the jurisprudential precedent established by the ruling in Moore
v. Regents of the University of California 107 case. The Supreme
Court of California rejected inter alia the plaintiff's suit. The
claimant was a patient whose cells had been processed in order to
obtain “cell line” that could be patented and become object of
numerous lucrative commercial agreements. The plaintiff sought
restitution of the cells, or at least recognition of his ownership and
therefore his entitlement to reap the financial benefits derived from
the commercialization of said “asset.” The court, specifically,
based its decision on the lack of jurisprudential precedents to
legitimize that an individual holds a property interest right over
parts or materials that have been detached from his body. 108 In the
105. On the latest, for example, see Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic
Ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy to Ensure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV.
827 (2006), that presents a stimulating proposal: to wrap the “veil of genetic
ignorance” around every individual, to insure that people are equally treated,
and by this prevent any possible form of discrimination.
106. Within the Italian doctrine, the theme of adequacy of the proprietary
paradigm, in regards to the body and its parts, has been specifically addressed by
Antonio Gambaro, who offered a critical assessment of the traditional arguments
sustaining the intangibility of the human body. Antonio Gambaro, Tessuti
biologici e parti del corpo, in LA PROPRIETÀ, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 39
(Giovanni Iudica & Paolo Zatti dir., 1990).
107. 249 Cal. Reporter. 494 (CA. COA 1988); aff’d in part, rev. in part, 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). The Italian
translation of the California Court of Appeals sentence is available in Foro it.,
1989, IV, 417, with notes by M. Paganelli, Alla volta di Frankestein:
bioteconologie e proprietà (di parti) del corpo umano, as well as the RIVISTA
CRITICA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 443 (1989), with notes by B. Edelman,
Discutendo il caso Moore, ivi, 469.
108. Truthfully, there was a precedent: the case Venner v. State, 354 A.2d
483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), judged in Maryland, in which the actual
question of whether a subject can retain property rights over biological material
detached from the body was addressed. It was concluded that an instance
wherein an individual claims ownership and authority rights over property such
as bodily secretions, nails, hair, blood, escrements, organs or other parts of the
body was not unheard of. The California Court of Appeals in fact referenced
that same case to support its opinion which states that the relationship between
and individual and his bodily parts should be included in the category of
property rights (although in the Moore case said right was not deemed
sustainable). The Venner case was used as a distinguishing by the Supreme
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opinion of the court, this right had been precluded by a number of
factors that sustained the opposite theory. 109 To this effect, it
should be noted that American jurisprudence cannot be said to be
unified in its support of this decision. The same majority opinion
has been countered by vigorous dissenting opinions in favor of
acknowledging property interest rights for materials detached from
someone's body. 110
In view of the observations made so far, in synthesis, it
becomes noticeable that the primary question posed by the genetic
information debate concerns the new era of genetic analysis and
the morphed concept of identity. How should we interpret the
relationships that exist between ourselves, our bodies, and our
identity, now that just about every “particle” of our body can fully
reveal our genetic information? The true magnitude of this
question was revealed by “abandoned DNA.”
C. The Controversial Case of “Abandoned DNA”
First of all, we must define abandoned DNA. This type of
DNA is defined as being any human tissue sample from which
genetic information can be extracted; material that has become
separated from a body for reasons other than the conscious consent

Court of California when it was called to render a verdict in the final instance of
the Moore proceedings. Specifically the Court ruled that, since the Venner case
involved a penal procedural issue and not a civil controversy aimed to establish
“which party was entitled to reap a financial benefit derived from the ownership
of an asset,” as in the proceeding de quo, that same would not have been
applicable to the situation at hand (793 P.2d 489, note 28).
109. The California Supreme Court decision seems to have been drawn on
concerns on political and social nature rather than actual juridical technicalities:
in fact, one of the most important reasons for the denial of the plaintiff's claim of
property right over materials detached from his body, was the concern that if the
right was acknowledged (and the compensation granted) it cold potentially
inhibit scientific research and experimental activities, with great consequences
for the community. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d
489.
110. Id. Those who support applying the property right paradigm to genetic
information do not view said instance as an insurmountable obstacle for their
solution and propose that the distinguishing criteria should also be applied to the
case at hand. From the latest by Harlan, supra note 40, at 202-207.
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of the subject, or subsequent to an official authority's injunction
order. 111
As previously noted, 112 since DNA resides in many types of
human tissue, the fact that a person may leave traces of genetically
relevant material in his/her path is an ordinary event. Routine
examples of this phenomenon are the traces of saliva left on coffee
cups, cigarette filters, drops of blood from an accidental cut, hair,
and even nail trimmings. In this regard, we must remember that
even a very small part of human tissue can be enough for testing
purposes, since this type of analysis does not require significant
amounts of material. On the other hand, as previously noted, 113
thanks to scientific advances, the ability to collect and examine
genetically relevant material from the scene of a crime has proven
to be an extremely useful and effective investigative tool.
Notwithstanding the undisputable usefulness of these activities,
the major cause of concern in the American environment (and
others) is the now widespread police practice of collecting and
analyzing samples of abandoned DNA, which are used not only to
investigate a current case, but also may be used in future or
potential investigations. 114

111. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 48.
112. See supra note 42, and the corresponding text.
113. In this regard, see the contents of Section 1.
114. The collection of abandoned DNA is a very useful method of
investigation since the samples of human tissue are readily accessible and, since
they can be taken without the subject's knowledge, this same cannot raise any
question or objection in regards to it. In this regard, the American culture
denotes the existence of multiple collection techniques. The most frequently
used is the one by which the investigators limit themselves to taking a DNA
sample from the traces of biologic material left by the individual (since it can be
found, for examples, on items used daily). In other instances, this is
accomplished by more ingenious methods. Seattle Police, for example,
suspected an individual of killing a young lady, but did not have enough
evidence to request a warrant. In order to obtain a sample from him, and
compare it with one taken from the crime scene, they resorted to a ploy: they
mailed a letter written on a non-existing attorney's office letterhead that
encouraged individuals to join in a class action lawsuit against municipal
authorities for the purpose of obtaining funds allegedly overpaid to them; in
order to join, the individual had to fill out a form, put it in a pre-addressed
enclosed envelope and mail it back to the sender. Thanks to the saliva left the
envelope flap, the police got the DNA sample they needed, and after the two
samples were compared, the suspect was convicted of second degree murder.
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This topic currently poses serious constitutional problems,
especially since the Federal and State criminal justice regulations
are silent on this point. If, as already ascertained, the acquisition
and storage of an individual’s DNA samples–within the mentioned
limits–is to be disciplined by a set of rules of different rankings
that prescribe specific attributes of form and substance, then
abandoned DNA does not seem to belong to any of the currently
established constitutional and legislative categories. 115
In this respect, it was noted that this phenomenon was partially
due to a terminological error.
Juridical implications and
terminological concerns are intrinsically connected since the
applicable legislative regime varies with the denomination
attributed to the matter. As a result, it was argued that abandoned
DNA could be freely collected and stored because it did not fall
under the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Its collection, in
fact, did not constitute a search in the technical sense. That theory
is supported by two ruling cases.
In first place, the asset could not be covered by the
constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment because the
contrary criteria applied by the US Supreme Court in Katz, 116
could be applied. According to this ruling, anything that
individuals willingly choose to make public, even from within their
homes or offices, falls outside the scope of protection. 117
The applicability of this form of protection would also be
invalidated by the status legally awarded to DNA after it is
discarded among refuse. In this case the same principle expressed
by the court in the California v. Greenwood 118 ruling would
become applicable. According to the ruling, there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to goods that can be
readily accessed by anyone due to the fact that they have been
placed in a public place, with the intent to dispose of them. As can
be recalled, a direct consequence of the court's reasoning was that

On this point, Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857 (2006).
115. Curley & Caperna, supra note 35, according to which this type of
material raises new questions in regards to the protection of privacy rights.
116. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
117. See supra note 72, and the corresponding text.
118. See supra, note 76, and the corresponding text.
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trash could be classified as being res derelicta, and as such be
claimed by third parties.
In both cases, therefore, abandoned DNA would fail to pass the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. Both theories have been
criticized. In first place, it was emphasized that renouncement of
the Fourth Amendment rights, according to the ruling rendered by
the court in Katz, presupposed that the goods were “consciously”
exposed to the public. In the instance of abandoned DNA, this
phenomenon would be totally involuntary and unavoidable.
Further, as far as the general circumstances are concerned, it could
be said that this is also an “unconscious” phenomenon. Although
it is common knowledge that hair is shed or that saliva traces can
be left on flatware and glasses, the same cannot be said of the
awareness that DNA samples can be extracted from it nor, a
fortiori, does it seem reasonable to presume that the massive
amounts of information that can be extracted from this material, or
that the extent of its possible uses, 119 are matters of common
knowledge.
Closely tied to the first objection is the argument that supports
the second. Without the element of conscious choice, the
equivalency between abandoned DNA and trash is deprived of any
logical or juridical basis. In fact, while in the case of trash the
animus derelinquendi can be implicitly deduced by the act of
abandoning it in a place where it is likely to be collected by third
parties (and therefore this would result in a loss of rights thereto),
the same cannot be said in regards to biologic material that an
individual inadvertently drops along his path. 120
The question of the intent required for a good to be deemed res
derelicta has been analyzed and elaborated upon by Italian
doctrine as well. Specifically, besides some differences of opinion
concerning elements of secondary importance, it was more or less
unanimously agreed that, in order for an item to be considered
abandoned–with the consequent loss of inherent rights–it must be

119. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 48, at 438.
120. In United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the
Court ruled that “in order to determine if an instance of “abandonment” is
relevant in accordance with the IV Amendment, the Court must focus on the
indent of the individual who is said to have abandoned said object.”
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accompanied by the conscious decision to do so on an individual's
part. 121
It also seems that another consideration may be added. Saying
that a person may appropriate someone else's biological material
(for example a Marilyn Monroe fan that picked up a piece of the
diva's hair from the path she trod and kept it as a relic) is one thing,
but it is vastly different from a situation that involves actually
analyzing said material in order to extract from it the juridically
distinct “asset” represented by the genetic inheritance contained
therein. 122 A great part of the debate unleashed by this event, as
we were saying, focused on the exact qualification and
denomination to be attributed to “abandoned DNA,” in view of the
inappropriate and ambiguous nature of that expression.
In this regard, several suggestions were made. One proposal
suggests considering this type of DNA as being the equivalent to
fingerprints, and applying to the first the same legislative rules that
regulate the second. 123 This option does not however appear to be
121. Worthy of reference: 1 G. Branca, ENC. DEL DIR. 3 (1958), v.
Abbandono (derelictio) (“Abandonment always has two aspects: the material
and the spiritual", this last specifically defines the animus derelinquendi); G.
Deiana, v. Abbandono (Private Law), id. at 5 (“abandonment is commonly
perceived as being the action of an owner who discards something with the
intent to renounce his dominion over it "); 5 S. Romano, NOVISS. DIG. IT. 546
(1960), v. Derelictio,
This material detachment from something, this total discontinuation of
any relationships with it, will then constitute derelictio as it represented
the actuation of the will to lose dominion over it. Chronologically,
therefore, this will is a prius, but it does not become effective until after
it translates into an actual act of abandonment.
Lastly, a contrario, 29 A. Trabucchi, ENC. DEL DIR. 618-621 (1979), v.
Occupazione (Private Law) (“the two elements that render the activity an actual
establishment of ownership are the initial possession and the animus
occupandi;” said affirmation correlates with the preceding declaration of the
Amendment, as far as the type of goods that would qualify as relevant matter
"another category expressly referenced by the code as meeting the applicability
requirements is the res derelictae. And, since it repeats the traditional doctrine
in the matter, these things do not qualify unless the action of derelictio was
accompanied by the intention of abandoning the rights on the subject matter
(animus derelinquendi);” finally “the existence of animus derelinquendi must be
presumed in order to qualify the object as having been subjected to this action”
and “the animus derelinquendi must be intended as being a specific orientation
towards the renouncement of the rights held over the object”).
122. In this regard, see the considerations expressed in Section 1.
123. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 48.
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satisfactory since, although it is true that a fingerprint can be traced
back to an individual, it is also true that this does not contain a set
of genetic information that pertains directly to the core traits of a
human being’s identity. After the investigative purposes are
exhausted, the potential usefulness of a fingerprint tends to
decrease. 124
Another proposal suggests considering DNA equivalent to the
body and its parts, giving the owner property rights over these
“assets.” 125 The topic, as is noted in the previous paragraph, is
highly debatable because it poses challenges of philosophical,
moral, and religious relevance. Also, this option seems to be
hindered by the regulations concerning the matter of organ
transplants, since generally the individual is acknowledged as
having a quasi-property right on these body parts. 126
The extremely controversial nature of the issue has left some
people with the belief that the relationship between the individual,
his body and body parts has been dropped in a sort of “judicial
limbo.” 127 In consideration of this, part of the doctrine brought
forth the proposal to qualify the DNA of an individual as a separate
juridical item, altogether distinguished from any other item and as
such subject to a juridical ad hoc discipline, which would allow
courts to take into consideration the totally peculiar nature of it (as
proposed by the genetic exceptionalism doctrine). 128 This option
also makes the distinction between human tissue and the genetic
information therein contained, and properly accounts for the
complex implications that accompany that type of information. 129
However, it must be warned that nowadays the genetic
exceptionalism approach seems to have lost some ground within
the American debate, in the light of the strong limits to the
development of scientific research which would result from it.
124. After reaching its future potential, the fingerprint will be able to reveal
if a subject has a criminal record or not.
125. See for example Michael J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right
in Genetic Material: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22
AM. J. L. AND MED. 109 (1996).
126. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 359 (2000).
127. Id. at 375.
128. For further considerations on the matter, see McLochlin, supra note
34.
129. Harlan, supra note 40, at 194.
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The attempt to correctly qualify abandoned DNA also took
place from a terminological standpoint. The question was
confronted directly in Australia, more specifically by the State of
Victoria. The residents of which demanded legislation to prevent
investigative authorities from conducting covert DNA sampling,
due to the authorities' tendency to avail themselves of objects used
on a daily basis in order to obtain from them DNA samples for
their investigative purposes. In this case, expressions such as
“abandoned DNA” were deliberately avoided in consideration of
the juridical implications associated with the term
“abandonment.” 130
In view of the above determination, in the US, it was then
proposed to name abandoned DNA covert involuntary DNA
sampling, to emphasize the absence of any voluntary characteristic
in the subject matter. 131
D. The Issue of the “Biological Group”
The doctrine that postulates to use legislative measures based
on the recognition of property rights in the matter of genetic
information, denounces the inadequacy of the privacy doctrine.
This is also due to a peculiar characteristic of that type of data: the
set of genetic information is common to multiple individuals, by
virtue of a close blood tie.
The scope of genetic information then involves not only just a
single individual, but a plurality of subjects, whom, due to sharing
that tie, form a “biological group.” For example, members of that
group would include ancestors and descendents but not spouses,
due to the absence of a common blood tie with these last. The
biological group, therefore, does not exactly align with the family
nucleus. 132
The magnitude of the issue manifested itself within the
American juridical system thanks to some comparative 133 research
that mentioned a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of
130. The information is reported in Joh, supra note 114, at 882.
131. Id.
132. On the “biological group,” see Denbo, supra note 95, at 564.
133. Recently, Hrobjartur Jonatansson, Iceland’s Health Sector Database:
A significant Head Start in the Search for the Biological Grail or an Irreversible
Error?, 26 AM. J. LAW AND MED. 31 (2000).
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Iceland. 134 In 1998, the Parliament of Iceland enacted a law
authorizing the creation of a centralized, non-identity specific
database. This would be used for collecting and archiving medical
data, in order to promote new (or perfect currently existing)
methods of diagnosis, prevention and treatment of multiple
illnesses. 135
More specifically, in order to facilitate early
prevention and diagnosis, it was deemed proper to include in the
database encoded versions of the medical history of all of the
citizens of Iceland (both living and deceased), that had not
expressly exercised their right to prevent their personal records
from being included in said database (called the opt-out clause). It
was also decided that the data could be connected to that of other
databases that contained genealogic and genetic information. 136
Two years after the law was instituted, the guardian of a fifteen
year old girl whose father had passed away, in accordance with the
lawful right to prevent the collection and archiving of personal
information, asked the authorities to omit the records of the
deceased father from the database. The request was denied on the
basis that the law did not expressly allow for an individual to use
the opt-out clause in regards to the genetic information of a
deceased parent. The event became a legal controversy. The
plaintiff maintained that she held a juridically relevant interest over
the subject matter. If her parent's genetic information was not
omitted from the database, her own current and future state of
health could be gleaned from that data; this information could
potentially cause future discrimination against her. The verdict
rejected the argument on the basis of the encoded and non-identity
specific nature of the data.
134. Guomundsdottir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, November 27th, 2003
(Ice.), reported in Recent Cases, Icelandic Supreme Court Holds That Inclusion
of an Individual’s Genetic Information in a National Database Infringes on the
Privacy Interests of His Child, 118 HARV. L. REV. 810 (2004).
135. Act on a Health Sector Database, No. 139/1998 (Ice), the English text
http://eng.heilbrigdisraduneyti.is/laws-andversion
available
at
regulations/nr/659 (last visited November 6, 2008).
136. Id. at sect. IV, art. 10. But also look at the critical observations
expressed by on the matter by Jonatansson, supra note 133, at 31, which
underline how, as a result of said practice, Iceland became the only Country in
the world that has authorized a private company to collect and store the genetic
legacy of an entire population, with inter alia of the right to use said genetic
patrimony as object of commercialization.
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The Supreme Court of Iceland however revised the decision,
affirming that: (i) the plaintiff did have a juridically relevant
interest in the matter; (ii) said request seemed to be in accordance
with the dispositions of the Icelandic Constitution; (iii) the original
court had failed to recognize that the natural traits of the subject
matter made the personal privacy right applicable to more than a
single individual; and (iv) the encoded nature of the data was not
sufficient to guarantee adequate protection of the rights of the
individuals involved. The most personal and intimate data of an
individual could in fact be deduced from the contents of the
associated genealogic and genetic databases. 137
The focal point of the verdict is that, for the first time, an
individual was acknowledged legal rights over the genetic
information of another person. Along those lines, part of the
American 138 doctrine asserts that the current configuration of
American privacy law provisions, which are structured over a
strictly individualistic concept of private information, and the fact
that the nature of genetic information is common to a group and
not merely to a single individual, property laws may better serve as
a paradigm to ensure that a greater level of protection is provided
for information that belongs to all of the individuals involved. 139
Once more, the malleability and flexibility of the concept of
property would allow confronting the issues derived from the state
of co-division of said sensitive data among individuals.
Particularly it is sustained that, as far as the characteristics of the
subject matter are concerned, the regulations pertaining to the
theme of joint ownership (joint tenancy, co-ownership) could be
applied. These norms in fact would allow disciplining potential
conflicts among individuals that hold the same right, as well as
137. Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 811-812.
138. From the latest, Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal
Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004).
139. Contra. see Denbo, supra note 95, who favors applying the
confidential relationship criteria, by which doctors should reveal confidential
information to the family members of the patient only with the express consent
of this last, while they should abstain from revealing the information if it
ascertains the presence of a terminal illness: this would be justified by the fact
that the right to privacy of each biological group member also implies the right
of remaining uninformed. The same, however, admits that it would be difficult
to actuate this distinction without first establishing a criterion by which to define
in which cases information could be disclosed, or not.
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exert control over cases pertaining to the ownership of genetically
shared material. 140
With reference to such an issue, for example, the Italian Civil
Code provides criterion in order to manage the relationships
among co-owners with regard to the owned good; it requires
different types of majorities according to the effect which the
decision that has to be taken will have on the good. In particular, it
might require a simple majority, a qualified one, or even a
unanimous decision depending upon how such a decision will
affect the good and the relevant ownership right. For example, the
unanimity of vote is required for the destruction of the good. 141
But, if these rules on one side could provide for such relationships,
on the other side they do not appear to be a so efficient tool
because of the objective difficulty to apply them in a real situation
involving DNA samples stored in a databank. In addition, the
application of the property paradigm to the phenomenon of the
biological group appears to be problematic with regard to a further
issue: the potential conflicts among members of the same group.
The risk that a member of such group might not be interested in
being aware of his/her genetic characteristics and genetic future
because such an awareness would affect in a negative way his/her
life without procuring any benefit at all, especially with reference
to the “mono-factorial” diseases (i.e. the diseases due to one single
element which can be deemed a sort of “defect” in the genetic
heritage of an individual, and whose development cannot be
avoided or slowed down by adopting, for example, a healthier style
of life). On the contrary, another member of the same group might
be very interested in being aware about the same genetic data, for
example for procreation purposes. About such not-so uncommon
scenarios, a solution could be that of recognizing the equal value of
both interests and therefore to grant the power and the task to
ensure the respect of both interests to a competent authority (for
example, a National Health System Authority) which should
ensure and enforce the right of the first person not to be informed
but, at the same time, the right of the latter to receive full
information. In addition, that competent authority should adopt all
the measures in order to avoid the dissemination of such data. As
it appears at first sight, such a proposal would be very difficult to
140. Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 816-817.
141. Italian Civil Code, arts. 1105 & 1108.
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manage and, on the other side, it would evoke the risk of a sort of
Leviathan, a super-entity entitled to control and manage all data
pertaining to the whole society, and to individuals on their own. 142
CONCLUSION
As can be noted from the previously discussed characteristics
of the subject matter, the protection of genetic information is yet to
be defined. In this regard, the major source of concern appears to
be the need to reassess the traditionally assigned juridical
categories to ensure that the genetic patrimony of individuals is
protected by thorough and effective legislative measures. The
initial tendency appears to point towards regulating genetic
information with measures that may be adjusted according to the
specifics of the context, with the option to choose, as needed,
which of the two doctrines may better serve to effectively protect
this type of information. But, again, the above mentioned appears
to be only one of the possible options to properly address such an
issue which, for the strict interdependency of moral and economic
reasons, in our opinion deserves to be analyzed and discussed indepth, in order to try to find a balance between distinct, and
sometimes conflicting, interests.

142. For further remarks about such an issue, see Carlo Augusto Viano, La
transizione genetica, RIVISTA BIMESTRALE DI CULTURA E POLITICA 1014-1022
( 2000).

